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Antiracist Remedial Approaches in 
Judge Gregory’s Jurisprudence 
Leah M. Litman* 
Abstract 
 
This piece uses the idea of antiracism to highlight parallels 
between school desegregation cases and cases concerning errors 
in the criminal justice system. There remain stark, pervasive 
disparities in both school composition and the criminal justice 
system. Yet even though judicial remedies are an integral part of 
rooting out systemic inequality and the vestiges of 
discrimination, courts have been reticent to use the tools at their 
disposal to adopt proactive remedial approaches to address these 
disparities. This piece uses two examples from Judge Roger 
Gregory’s jurisprudence to illustrate how an antiracist approach 
to judicial remedies might work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of George Floyd’s murder, there was 
considerable public interest in learning more about antiracism.1 
Ibram Kendi’s canonical work explains that antiracism is a 
commitment both to deconstructing power structures that allow 
racism to continue and to affirmatively constructing systems 
that facilitate equity and inclusion.2 In Kendi’s telling, it does 
not suffice for someone to merely not be racist; instead, Kendi 
argued, dismantling systemic inequalities requires people to 
take affirmative steps and adopt proactive, antiracist 
approaches.3 At the time, people understood that claim as a call 
to educate themselves and one another about race and systemic 
inequality.4 Pieces on antiracism invited readers to think about 
particular policies that might embed or reproduce racial 
inequalities, such as redlining, when mortgage loaners decline 
loans to Black families in certain housing areas, or other forms 
of housing discrimination.5 
 
 1. See, e.g., Marlene F. Watson et al., Black Lives Matter: We Are in the 
Same Storm but We Are Not in the Same Boat, 59 FAM. PROCESS 1362, 1362 
(2020) (focusing on Black Lives Matter as a platform for educating people 
about racial inequality, oppression, and Black dehumanization). 
 2. See IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 9–10 (2019) 
(identifying antiracist actions as those that “locate[] the roots of problems in 
power and policies” and “confront[] racial inequities”). For a critique of 
previous antiracist approaches, see generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, 
“Gay Rights” for “Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity and Equal Protection, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1358 (2000). 
 3. KENDI, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
 4. See, e.g., Anna North, What It Means to Be Anti-Racist, VOX (June 3, 
2020, 1:50 PM), https://perma.cc/V6RU-4GUD (“To be an 
anti-racist . . . requires an understanding of history—an understanding that 
racial disparities in America have their roots, not in some failing by people of 
color but in policies that serve to prop up white supremacy.”); Eric Deggans, 
‘Not Racist’ Is Not Enough: Putting in the Work to Be Anti-Racist, NPR (Aug. 
25, 2020, 12:03 AM), https://perma.cc/G7QU-48NZ (encouraging readers to 
learn about the history of antiracism and to engage with movies and TV shows 
that challenge their notions of race and culture). 
 5. See North, supra note 4 (discussing how redlining led to Black 
Americans being “more likely to live in neighborhoods affected by 
environmental contamination”); Alvin Chang, Living in a Poor Neighborhood 
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There was also renewed focus on the judicial doctrines and 
laws governing policing and criminal justice, specifically 
qualified immunity.6 Revisiting those doctrines became part of 
calls for antiracism.7 
With that lens in mind, this piece explores some of the past 
and present approaches to judicial remedies for racial 
inequities. It draws a parallel between the Supreme Court’s 
struggle over how to remedy school segregation (broadly defined 
to include schools that are primarily one race) and federal 
courts’ struggles over whether to remedy errors in the criminal 
justice system that disproportionately fall on Black defendants. 
And it invites readers to think about what an antiracist 
jurisprudence on remedies would be. 
I. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION REMEDIES 
The aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education8 (Brown I) 
captures how judicial remedies may be part of an antiracist 
jurisprudence. Brown I held that “[s]eparate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal” and invalidated school 
assignment policies that maintained segregated public schools 
by assigning students to schools based on their race.9 Because 
school segregation was so prevalent at the time, it was unclear 
what Brown I required states and school districts to do in order 
 
Changes Everything About Your Life, VOX (Apr. 4, 2018, 12:00 PM), 
https://perma.cc/849Y-BWPW (recounting how housing policies created “two 
divergent Americas, one with money, and one without—and the one without 
is largely black”). 
 6. See Jacob Knutson, Pew Poll: Americans Support Allowing Citizens to 
Sue Officers for Misconduct, AXIOS (July 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/9U8F-
B8TN (explaining what qualified immunity is and evaluating poll results on 
abolishing it); Ben Embry, Why Now is the Time to End Qualified Immunity, 
THE PITCH (July 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/9LU5-PGZF (arguing for an end to 
qualified immunity in the wake of George Floyd’s murder by police). 
 7. See Nicole Cardoza, Abolish Qualified Immunity., ANTI-RACISM DAILY 
(July 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/N4W5-GMDY (analyzing how qualified 
immunity prevents justice for victims of police violence). 
 8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 9. Id. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”). 
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to comply with the decision.10 One possibility was that Brown I 
required schools to end school assignment policies that formally 
and explicitly assigned students to segregated schools based on 
race. A second possibility was that Brown I required states and 
schools to undertake affirmative steps to eradicate vestiges of 
segregation, and to bring about integrated schools. 
The Supreme Court initially sidestepped this question. In 
Brown v. Board of Education11 (Brown II), decided the year after 
Brown I, the Court said only that “[s]chool authorities have the 
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving 
these problems”12 while courts would “be guided by equitable 
principles” in “shaping . . . remedies.”13 Although the Court 
emphasized “the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission 
to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory 
basis,”14 the opinion became better known for the directive that 
courts should ensure that schools admit students on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis “with all deliberate speed.”15 
While the Supreme Court stayed out of school 
desegregation litigation for a few years, except in a few cases 
involving massive resistance,16 the Court began to enter the fray 
in the 1960s. When it did so, the Court issued opinions that 
seemed to adopt the second approach to the Brown II 
remedynamely, that schools had to undertake affirmative 
steps to eliminate racial segregation in schools, even when they 
no longer had policies that explicitly assigned students to 
segregated schools on the basis of race. 
For example, in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince 
Edward County,17 the Court addressed Virginia’s response to 
Brown. The Virginia legislature had initially closed all public 
schools that were integrated and granted funds to “private” 
 
 10. See id. (reserving the question of the proper remedy while noting “the 
wide applicability of this decision”). 
 11. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 12. Id. at 299. 
 13. Id. at 300. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 301. 
 16. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (rejecting the Little 
Rock School Board’s plan to suspend racial desegregation of schools). 
 17. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
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schools; after the school closures were invalidated by the 
Virginia Supreme Court on state law grounds, Virginia adopted 
a “freedom of choice” plan.18 But Prince Edward County’s public 
schools remained closed.19 After finding that Prince Edward 
County’s school policies were unconstitutional, the Court 
emphasized the importance of providing “quick and effective” 
relief.20 The Court upheld the district court’s injunction that 
prohibited county officials from paying tuition grants or tax 
exemptions related to tuition grants for private schools so long 
as the public schools remained closed.21 The Court also stated 
that the district court could require officials to levy taxes “to 
raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without 
racial discrimination a public school system in Prince Edward 
County.”22 And in a passage of the opinion that presaged what 
was to come, the Court declared that “[t]he time for mere 
‘deliberate speed’ has run out, and that phrase can no longer 
justify denying these . . . children their constitutional rights.”23 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent24 later addressed 
a “freedom of choice” plan adopted in the wake of Brown. The 
question in the case was whether the plan adequately remedied 
school segregation and Brown violations.25 New Kent County, 
according to the Court, had a roughly equal number of white and 
Black residents, and the schools had roughly equal numbers of 
white and Black students.26 In compliance with Virginia law, the 
district had initially maintained a segregated school system, 
 
 18. Id. at 221–23. 
 19. Id. at 222–23. 
 20. See id. at 232–33 (recognizing that an injunction would halt New Kent 
County’s practices that “deprive petitioners of the same advantages of a public 
school education enjoyed by children in every other part of Virginia”). 
 21. See id. (“We have no doubt of the power of the court to give this relief 
to enforce the discontinuance of the county’s racially discriminatory 
practices.”). 
 22. Id. at 233. 
 23. Id. at 234. 
 24. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 25. Id. at 432. 
 26. See id. (stating that out of 1,300 students in Kent County, 740 were 
Black and 550 were white). 
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and it continued to do so after Brown.27 The county then adopted 
a school assignment policy that automatically reassigned 
students to their previous schools and allowed new students to 
be assigned by the Board.28 Soon after that assignment was 
challenged as unconstitutional, the Board adopted a freedom of 
choice plan.29 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, invalidated 
the school’s freedom of choice plan. The Court explained that 
“Brown II was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual 
systems tempered by an awareness that complex and 
multifaceted problems would arise which would require time 
and flexibility for a successful resolution.”30 The Court 
underscored that states and school boards have the “affirmative 
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary” to bring about 
“a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be 
eliminated root and branch.”31 And the Court insisted that 
school boards must “bend their efforts” to achieve integration 
and dismantle segregation.32 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education33 
recognized courts’ broad powers to ensure that school boards 
were undertaking those efforts and fulfilling their constitutional 
obligations.34 The Charlotte-Mecklenberg school district served 
a student body that was 71 percent white and 29 percent 
Black.35 Yet Black students overwhelmingly attended schools 
concentrated in the city of Charlotte, and two-thirds of those 
students attended schools that served more than 99 percent 
Black students.36 The district court rejected the school board’s 
proposed plan for achieving integrated schools and imposed a 
 
 27. Id. at 432–33. 
 28. Id. at 433. 
 29. Id. at 434. 
 30. Id. at 437. 
 31. Id. at 437–38. 
 32. Id. at 438. 
 33. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 34. See id. at 15 (“Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope 
of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for 
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”). 
 35. Id. at 6. 
 36. Id. at 6–7. 
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court-ordered plan that the Supreme Court affirmed.37 The 
court-ordered plan included: a “mathematical ratio” that 
operated as a presumption for the racial balance that the schools 
should reflect (which reflected the population of the district); 
“close scrutiny” of single-race schools; redrawn school zones and 
school district lines; and bus transportation of students.38 
But that aggressive remedial approach, which required 
states to undertake efforts to root out vestiges of discrimination 
and allowed courts to push them in that direction, lasted a mere 
decade. Three later cases, Keyes v. School District No. 1,39 
Milliken v. Bradley,40 and Board of Education v. Dowell41 
highlight the second alternative approach to judicial remedies 
for racial discrimination. 
Keyes in particular underscores how courts can take a 
different approach to remedies even while they purport to 
embrace a broad interpretation of constitutional rights. Keyes 
addressed the Denver school system, which had never 
“mandated or permitted racial segregation in public 
education.”42 In Keyes, the plaintiffs “apparently 
concede[d] . . . that in the case of a school system like Denver’s, 
where no statutory dual system has ever existed, plaintiffs must 
prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it 
was brought about or maintained by intentional state action.”43 
Based on the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the 
plaintiffs had shown that the state intentionally maintained 
segregation in a significant portion of the school system such 
that the court could presume other segregated schools in the 
system were also the result of intentional segregation.44 
 
 37. See id. at 10 (explaining how the district court accepted a plan that 
had been modified by a court-appointed expert). 
 38. Id. at 22–30. 
 39. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
 40. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 41. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 42. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 191. 
 43. Id. at 198. 
 44. See id. at 206 (“On the question of segregative intent, petitioners 
presented evidence tending to show that the Board, through its actions over a 
period of years, intentionally created and maintained the segregated character 
of the core city schools.”). 
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Justice Powell’s separate writing foreshadowed a turning 
point in the Court’s remedial jurisprudence. Justice Powell 
wrote separately to disagree with the Court’s articulation of the 
constitutional right that was at stake in the cases.45 The issue 
was not, Justice Powell explained, whether the state 
intentionally maintained a system of school segregation or 
mandated segregation in public education by law. “[P]resent 
constitutional doctrine,” Justice Powell explained, “requir[es] 
affirmative state action to desegregate school systems.”46 And 
the existence of school segregation, Justice Powell wrote, had a 
“familiar root cause”—“segregated residential and migratory 
patterns the impact of which . . . was often perpetuated and 
rarely ameliorated by action of public school authorities.”47 The 
existence of segregated schools was “largely unrelated to 
whether a particular State had or did not have segregative 
school laws.”48 Justice Powell explained that he “would 
not . . . perpetuate the de jure/de facto distinction” and would 
instead hold “that where segregated public schools exist within 
a school district to a substantial degree, there is a prima facie 
case that the duly constituted public authorities . . . are 
sufficiently responsible.”49 “Public schools are creatures of the 
State, and whether the segregation is state-created or 
state-assisted or merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant 
to constitutional principle.”50 
Yet while Justice Powell would have more expansively 
defined the constitutional right at issue in the school 
desegregation cases, he was considerably more circumspect 
about what judicial remedies might be appropriate to enforce 
that right. For example, whereas Swann endorsed the use of 
busing to achieve integrated schools, Justice Powell warned 
about “extensive student transportation solely to achieve 
integration” even though he had just emphasized school 
 
 45. See id. at 265 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(taking issue with the “long leap” in the majority’s application of constitutional 
doctrine). 
 46. Id. at 221. 
 47. Id. at 222–23. 
 48. Id. at 223. 
 49. Id. at 224. 
 50. Id. at 227. 
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districts’ affirmative obligation to bring about integrated schools 
even where segregated schools were not the result of intentional 
or formal state segregation.51 
Milliken v. Bradley and Board of Education v. Dowell 
announced formal limits that clipped the scope of judicial 
remedies for school segregation. Milliken v. Bradley involved a 
challenge to Detroit-area schools.52 The district court had 
imposed a remedy spanning multiple school districts after 
finding that one school district had engaged in practices that 
were intended to perpetuate racially segregated schools.53 The 
district court and court of appeals determined that a 
multidistrict remedy was necessary to prevent a metropolitan 
area that included primarily Black schools surrounded by 
neighboring districts with primarily white schools.54 The 
Supreme Court rejected that remedy: “Before the boundaries of 
separate and autonomous school districts may be set 
aside . . . for remedial purposes . . . it must first be shown that 
racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, 
or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of 
inter-district segregation.”55  
In dissent, Justice White expressed the concern that “[t]he 
result is that the State of Michigan, the entity at which the 
Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has successfully insulated 
itself from its duty to provide effective desegregation remedies 
by vesting sufficient power over its public schools in its local 
school districts.”56 And Justice Marshall, in a separate dissent, 
described the decision as “the Court’s refusal to remedy separate 
and unequal education.”57 
Dowell cut back further on judicial remedies for segregation 
by imposing a time limit on courts’ power to impose remedies for 
 
 51. Id. at 242. 
 52. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 722–23 (1974) (summarizing 
the respondents’ allegations concerning public schools in Detroit). 
 53. See id. at 731–34 (detailing the scope of the district court’s remedy to 
the segregation problem it identified). 
 54. See id. at 732–33 (explaining the district court’s rationale for 
approving the multidistrict remedy). 
 55. Id. at 744–45. 
 56. Id. at 763 (White, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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school systems that were segregated by law.58 In that case, the 
school board had been subject to a judicially ordered 
desegregation plan for five years.59 The school board voluntarily 
continued to follow the court-ordered plan for an additional six 
to seven years before abandoning it.60 By that time, the Court 
reasoned, the “passage of time” made it inappropriate for courts 
to order judicially imposed remedies for formal segregation that 
had existed a little more than a decade earlier.61 
II. CRIMINAL JUSTICE REMEDIES 
With that background in mind, consider a similar 
relationship between rights and judicial remedies with respect 
to a particular issue in the criminal justice system—erroneous 
mandatory minimum sentences. 
The criminal justice system is rife with racial 
disparitiesdisparities in who is arrested, what happens when 
someone is stopped or arrested, and what people are charged 
with (if charges are pursued).62 Mandatory minimums, statutes 
 
 58. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 238 (1991) (“[T]he board’s 
compliance with previous court orders is obviously relevant in deciding 
whether to modify or dissolve a desegregation decree, since the passage of time 
results in changes in board personnel and enables the court to observe the 
board’s good faith in complying with the decree.”). 
 59. See id. at 241 (explaining that in 1972, the District Court—after 
finding previous efforts to eliminate state-imposed segregation 
unsuccessful“ordered the Board to adopt the ‘Finger Plan,’” to desegregate 
schools). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 249 
The test espoused by the Court of Appeals would condemn a school 
district, once governed by a board which intentionally 
discriminated, to judicial tutelage for the indefinite future. Neither 
the principles governing the entry and dissolution of injunctive 
decrees, nor the commands of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, require any such Draconian result. 
 62. See CHARLES PUZZANCHERA & SARAH HOCKENBERRY, JUVENILE COURT 
STATISTICS 2010, at 5–27 (2013), https://perma.cc/GG7P-YE64 (PDF) 
(documenting the volume of delinquency cases referred to juvenile court and 
examining the types of offenses charged and demographic characteristics of 
the juveniles involved by age, gender, and race); Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, 
NAACP (2021), https://perma.cc/5LG2-MJBT (highlighting racial disparities 
in all levels of the criminal justice system); Wendy Sawyer, Visualizing the 
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that establish a required minimum sentence for particular 
offenders, are no exception.63 There are pronounced racial 
disparities in which defendants are charged and sentenced 
under statutes containing mandatory minimum sentences.64 In 
the federal system, “black men have 1.75 times the odds of 
facing such charges, which is equivalent to a 5 percentage point 
(or 65 percent) increase in the probability for the average 
defendant.”65 And because mandatory minimum sentences are 
often harsh, “[t]he initial mandatory minimum charging 
decision alone is capable of explaining more than half of the 
black-white sentence disparities not otherwise explained by 
pre-charge characteristics.”66 
One particularly prominent example was the disparity 
between sentences for drug offenses involving crack versus 
powder cocaine. Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,67 
Congress imposed mandatory minimum sentences based on the 
 
Racial Disparities in Mass Incarceration, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 27, 
2020), https://perma.cc/9GYA-9JFD (“Systemic racism is evident at every 
stage of the system, from policing to prosecutorial decisions, pretrial release 
processes, sentencing, correctional discipline, and even reentry.”); Radley 
Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence That the Criminal Justice System is 
Racist. Here’s the Proof, WASH. POST (June 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/34EK-
DTRP (compiling evidence of racial bias in the criminal justice system); 
ELIZABETH HINTON ET AL., AN UNJUST BURDEN: THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF 
BLACK AMERICANS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/8MJE-7SNX (PDF) (presenting an “overview of the ways in 
which America’s history of racism and oppression continues to manifest in the 
criminal justice system, and a summary of research demonstrating how the 
system perpetuates the disparate treatment of black people”). 
 63. See FAMM, MANDATORY MINIMUMS IN A NUTSHELL 1 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/4PEV-7JZ6 (PDF) (“A mandatory minimum is a sentence, 
created by Congress or a state legislature, which the court must give to a 
person convicted of a crime, no matter what the unique circumstances of the 
offender or the offense are.”). 
 64. See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and 
Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 
123 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (2013) (explaining that “a black-white gap” in sentencing 
“appears to stem largely from prosecutors’ charging choices, especially 
decisions to charge defendants with ‘mandatory minimum’ offenses”). 
 65. Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Racial Disparity in Federal 
Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1323 (2014). 
 66. Id. at 1323. 
 67. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 841 (2004)). 
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amount of drug involved in the offense; Congress used a 100-to-1 
disparity in the amounts of crack versus powder cocaine that 
triggered the mandatory minimum.68 As a result of the 100-to-1 
ratio, Black offenders served almost as much time in prison for 
a nonviolent drug offense as white offenders did for violent 
offenses, and 85 percent of the thousands of people sentenced for 
crack cocaine offenses under the 100-to-1 regime were Black 
offenders.69  
It was against this backdrop of racial disparities in 
mandatory minimum sentences that the issue in United States 
v. Surratt70 arose. The question in Surratt is a technical one 
about the availability of judicial remedies for mistaken 
convictions or sentences.71 An extensive corpus of federal law 
governs the availability of federal post-conviction review for 
federal prisoners. For persons whose convictions and sentences 
have become final (i.e., their direct appeals and possible petition 
 
 68. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II) (codifying that anyone in 
possession of “5 kilograms or more of a . . . detectable amount 
of . . . cocaine . . . shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not 
be less than 10 years or more than life and if death or serious bodily injury 
results . . . not less than 20 years . . . ”), with § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (codifying that 
anyone in possession of “50 grams or more of a mixture or substance described 
in clause (ii) which contains cocaine base . . . shall be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or more . . . ”). 
 69. See DOJ, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 112 (2003), 
https://perma.cc/L46C-B8KG (PDF) (highlighting that Black offenders served 
an average of 58.7 months for drug offenses, while white offenders served an 
average of 74.7 months for violent offenses); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, ANALYSIS OF 
THE IMPACT OF AMENDMENT TO THE STATUTORY PENALTIES FOR CRACK COCAINE 
OFFENSES MADE BY THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT OF 2010 AND CORRESPONDING 
PROPOSED PERMANENT GUIDELINE AMENDMENT IF THE GUIDELINE AMENDMENT 
WERE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY 19 (2011), https://perma.cc/M6F5-H3TR (PDF) 
(showing that 85 percent of people who would benefit from a proposed 
amendment reducing mandatory minimum sentences are Black); Richard 
Hartley & J. Mitchell Miller, Crack-ing the Media Myth: Reconsidering 
Sentencing Severity for Cocaine Offenders by Drug Type, 35 CRIM. JUST. REV. 
67, 71 (2010) (“Eighty-five percent of crack offenders who are subject to 
minimums are Black[.]”). 
 70. 797 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted and dismissed as 
moot, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 71. See id. at 244–45 (examining whether the defendant was entitled to 
post-conviction relief under a § 2255 motion where the sentencing guidelines 
recommended a penalty of 19.6 years, yet the court imposed a life sentence). 
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for certiorari to the Supreme Court have finished),72 federal law 
provides them one year to file a motion under Section 225573 
challenging their sentence.74 And for persons who have already 
filed one motion under Section 2255, federal law provides that a 
“second or successive motion” must be certified by a court of 
appeals to contain either “newly discovered 
evidence . . . sufficient to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the 
movant guilty of the offense” or “a new rule of constitutional law, 
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court.”75 Neither of those conditions explicitly permit federal 
prisoners to file second or successive motions under Section 
2255 if they were mistakenly convicted or sentenced on the basis 
of an error of statutory interpretation—that is, a court 
misinterpreted a statute, rather than mistakenly upholding the 
statute as constitutional.76 
In a series of decisions after these restrictions were enacted, 
courts held that federal defendants could nonetheless challenge 
their convictions or sentences under what is known as the 
“savings clause” of Section 2255—Section 2255(e). That section 
allows a federal prisoner to file an “application for a writ of 
habeas corpus” where “the remedy by [Section 2255] motion is 
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”77 
Several courts held that a defendant could proceed under this 
section if the defendant was mistakenly convicted based on an 
error of statutory interpretation—that is, if the statute, properly 
interpreted, did not make the defendant’s conduct a criminal 
 
 72. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987) (“But after we 
have decided a new rule in the case selected, the integrity of judicial review 
requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review.”); 
Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 39 (2011) (“Finality occurs when direct state 
appeals have been exhausted and a petition for writ of certiorari from this 
Court has become time barred or has been disposed of.”). 
 73. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
 74. See id. § 2255(f) (stating that a “1-year period of limitation shall apply 
to a motion under this section”). 
 75. Id. § 2255(h). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. § 2255(e). 
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offense.78 Several courts likewise held that defendants could 
proceed under that section where a defendant was sentenced 
above the correct statutory maximum based on an error of 
statutory interpretation—that is, where the statutes, properly 
interpreted, capped a defendant’s term of imprisonment below 
the sentence the defendant actually received.79 (Over the last 
several years, two courts of appeals have adopted a different 
approach, and suggested that defendants cannot rely on the 
savings clause under these circumstances.80 One of the opinions 
was written by then-Judge Gorsuch on the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.81) 
The question in Surratt was whether a defendant could rely 
on the savings clause under a slightly different set of 
circumstances—where the defendant was mistakenly subject to 
a mandatory minimum sentence on the basis of an error of 
statutory interpretation.82 In Surratt, the sentencing court 
determined that Mr. Surratt was subject to a mandatory 
minimum term of life imprisonment based on his prior 
 
 78. See Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that a 
defendant can use the habeas corpus statute to challenge the legality of a 
sentence based on an error in statutory interpretation under § 2255(e)); In re 
Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that under proper 
statutory interpretation, the conduct the defendant was incarcerated for was 
not criminal); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997) (observing that 
the defendant could pursue a remedy under the federal habeas corpus statute 
where a shift in statutory interpretation would have resulted in the conviction 
and sentence being unlawful). 
 79. See, e.g., Webster v. Caraway, 761 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2014), 
vacated by order granting reh’g en banc, 769 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 2014); Bryant 
v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1274, 1277–79 (11th Cir. 2013); Gilbert v. United 
States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 
243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 80. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 
1076, 1085 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (explaining that after careful review of 
the terms and whole text of the statute that “a change in caselaw does not 
trigger relief under the savings clause”). 
 81. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011) (arguing 
that the language employed by Congress in writing the savings clause, as well 
as the history of the clause, “illustrates that Congress’s purpose in enacting it 
surely wasn’t to ensure that a prisoner will win relief on a meritorious 
successive motion, or receive multiple bites at the apple”). 
 82. United States v. Surratt, 215 F. App’x 222, 223 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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drug-related convictions.83 But that conclusion was based on an 
error of statutory interpretation—Mr. Surratt was not subject 
to that mandatory minimum.84 Under the statutes properly 
interpreted, Mr. Surratt still could have been sentenced to a 
term of life imprisonment since life imprisonment was the 
statutory maximum term for Mr. Surratt’s offense.85 But the 
district court did not have to sentence Mr. Surratt to life 
imprisonment; it could have given him a different sentence. 
Instead, it imposed life imprisonment based on the belief that 
life imprisonment was the only permissible sentence under the 
statute.86 
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit initially said that defendants could not rely on the 
savings clause under those circumstances—where defendants 
were mistakenly sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment that still fell within the correct statutory 
maximum for their offense.87 Judge Gregory authored a stinging 
dissent.88 I won’t rehash all of the arguments he made about 
why defendants can rely on the savings clause when they were 
improperly sentenced under a mandatory term of 
 
 83. See id. (“[A]t one point in the sentencing hearing the district court 
stated its agreement with the Government when the Government erroneously 
stated that Surratt’s calculated advisory guideline range notwithstanding the 
statutory mandatory minimum, was 360 months to life, rather than 188 to 235 
months.”); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (codifying the conspiracy to possesses with 
the intent to distribute cocaine and other narcotics as a crime punishable up 
to life imprisonment). 
 84. See United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (overturning the Fourth Circuit’s previous decision interpreting the 
relevant mandatory minimum). 
 85. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (stating a term of life imprisonment as 
the statutory maximum for a violation of subsection (a) of the statute). 
86. United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 269 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, 
J., dissenting). 
 87. See id. at 244 (majority opinion) (explaining that the district court 
correctly determined the savings clause did not confer jurisdiction to consider 
Surratt’s petition). 
 88. See id. at 269 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (“Raymond Surratt will die in 
prison because of a sentence that the government and the district court agree 
is undeserved and unjust.”). 
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imprisonment.89 But suffice it to say there are many powerful 
ones—the Section 2255 remedy was created to streamline 
federal post-conviction review;90 errors of statutory 
interpretation have long been cognizable in federal 
post-conviction proceedings;91 the precedential backdrop to 
section 2255 was a regime in which errors of statutory 
interpretation could be corrected in second or successive 
motions;92 and there are many reasons to think that the savings 
clause for federal prisoners preserves the habeas remedy for 
precisely those circumstances.93 Section 2255, after all, 
authorizes claims challenging the “legality” of a “sentence” in 
addition to a conviction.94 
While Judge Gregory’s dissent did not carry the day in the 
panel decision in Surratt, it did lead the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to grant rehearing en banc in the 
 
 89. For a longer examination, see Brandon Hasbrouck, Saving Justice: 
Why Sentencing Errors Fall Within the Savings Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), 
108 GEO. L.J. 287, 300–01 (2019); Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and 
Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV. 417, 485–89 (2018) (examining various 
interpretations of Section 2255(e)); Leah M. Litman, Judge Gorsuch and 
Johnson Resentencing (This is Not a Joke), 115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 67, 7477 
(2017) (critiquing an opinion that denied defendants a remedy under Section 
2255(e)). 
 90. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213–14, 215, 217, 219 
(1952) (recounting Section 2255’s legislative history); id. at 218 (quoting a 
House Report stating that Section 2255 was designed to “provide[] an 
expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sentences without resort to 
habeas corpus”); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 775 (2008) (explaining 
that Congress’s “purpose and effect” in enacting Section 2255 “was not to 
restrict access to the writ but to make postconviction proceedings more 
efficient”). 
 91. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 428 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(“[O]ne purpose of traditional habeas relief was to remedy statutory, as well 
as constitutional, claims presenting ‘a fundamental defect which inherently 
results in a complete miscarriage of justice’ and ‘exceptional circumstances 
where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is 
present.’” (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974))). 
 92. See e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963) (explaining 
that abuse of the writ doctrine limited a second or successive claim predicated 
on a claim that was “deliberately withh[e]ld[]”). 
 93. See id. at 10–11 (explaining that Section 2255 was “not intended to 
change the law as judicially evolved” on abuse of the writ doctrine governing 
second or successive petitions). 
 94. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), (e). 
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case.95 President Barack Obama later commuted Mr. Surratt’s 
sentence, which made the case moot and the en banc court never 
released an opinion.96 But the order granting rehearing en banc 
in Surratt, which vacated the panel opinion, stood.97 And it 
allowed the Fourth Circuit to later adopt Judge Gregory’s 
approach to the savings clause in United States v. Wheeler.98 In 
that case, the court held that defendants could challenge the 
erroneous application of a mandatory minimum sentence under 
the savings clause.99 
There is a parallel between the school desegregation cases 
and the criminal sentencing ones. No one can deny the existence 
of stark racial disparities in education or in the criminal justice 
system,100 even though people may dispute their precise causes. 
The cases raise the question of whether courts and other 
branches of the government have an obligation to eliminate the 
disparities and vestiges of discrimination root and branch.101 
CONCLUSION 
Federal resentencing is hardly the only area in which it 
could be helpful to think about what an antiracist approach to 
remedies might look like. Qualified immunity is another; as the 
introduction suggested, people invested in antiracism have 
already begun to train their focus on that body of law.102 
 
 95. United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(mem.). 
 96. Id. at 219. 
 97. See id. at 225 (Wynn, J., dissenting from the dismissal) (“Petitioner 
moved for rehearing en banc, which we granted, thereby vacating the panel 
opinion.”); Surratt v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 554, 554 (2017) (denying 
certiorari). 
 98. See 886 F.3d 415, 433 (4th Cir. 2018) (“We agree with our sister 
circuits’ view—and the view of Chief Judge Gregory’s dissent in Surrattthat 
a sentencing error need not result in a sentence that exceeds statutory limits 
in order to be a fundamental defect.”). 
 99. See id. at 428 (“[Section] 2255(e) must provide an avenue for prisoners 
to test the legality of their sentences. . . .”). 
 100. See supra notes 26, 36, and 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 101. See supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text. 
 102. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
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Here too, Judge Gregory’s jurisprudence provides a 
roadmap; it addresses a fact pattern that has, tragically but 
unsurprisingly, occurred again. 
Henry v. Purnell103 involved a damages suit against a 
deputy sheriff who shot an unarmed suspect who was running 
away from the sheriff.104 (The sheriff had a warrant for the 
suspect’s arrest for failure to pay child support.)105 The sheriff 
invoked the defense of qualified immunity, which shields 
officers against damages liability except in cases where the 
officer violates a clearly established constitutional right.106 The 
officer argued that because he intended to discharge his taser, 
there was no clearly established violation (given the officer’s 
uncertainty about whether he was discharging his gun).107 A 
panel of judges on the Fourth Circuit initially agreed that the 
officer could be entitled to qualified immunity if mistaking the 
gun for the taser was reasonable, over a dissent by Judge 
Gregory.108 The en banc court, in an opinion written by Judge 
Gregory, reversed that decision and found that the officer was 
not entitled to qualified immunity—and that the officer’s use of 
deadly force against an unarmed fleeing suspect was a clearly 
established constitutional violation.109 As Judge Gregory 
explained, what mattered is that the officer’s actions were 
 
 103. 652 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 104. Id. at 527. 
 105. Id. at 532. 
 106. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
 107. See Henry v. Purnell, 619 F.3d 323, 331 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Deputy 
Purnell responds that the short time period in which he had to act and his 
unfamiliarity with the gun and taser rendered his mistaken use of the firearm 
objectively reasonable.”). 
 108. Compare id. at 340 (“The lawfulness of Deputy Purnell’s conduct was 
thus open to reasonable dispute at the time of the shooting.”) (internal 
quotation omitted), with id. at 345 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (“Officer Purnell 
failed to conform his conduct to the Supreme Court’s specific mandate that 
police not use deadly force against suspects who are unarmed and who pose no 
threat to the officer or others.”). 
 109. See Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 536 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(“Purnell’s use of deadly force against Henry was objectively unreasonable and 
violated clearly established law, namely Tennessee v. Garner’s prohibition 
against shooting suspects who pose no significant threat of death or serious 
physical injury to the officer or others.”). 
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clearly unlawful; it was irrelevant what the officer thought he 
was doing.110 
If this fact pattern sounds familiar, it should: those are also 
the circumstances of Daunte Wright’s death.111 A police officer 
shot and killed Daunte after the officer apparently intended to 
use their taser.112 
Much remains to be done to address systemic inequality in 
our constitutional system. Remedies cannot and should not be 
the only fix, since they are primarily backward looking and only 
somewhat preventative through deterrence. But as this piece 
has suggested, remedies are an integral part of rooting out 
systemic inequality and vestiges of discrimination. Judge 
Gregory’s jurisprudence shows how. 
 
 110. See id. at 535 (“[T]he qualified immunity determination is an 
objective one, dependent not on the subjective beliefs of the particular officer 
at the scene . . . .” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 111. See What to Know About the Death of Daunte Wright, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
23, 2021), https://perma.cc/CEV3-9854 (describing the arresting officer’s 
mistaking of a firearm for a taser). 
 112. Shawn Hubler & Jeremy White, How Could an Officer Mistake a Gun 
for a Taser?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/X2ST-MWUY. 
